



Preliminary reliability and safety assessment methodology for trans-atmospheric transportation systems / Fusaro,
Roberta; Viola, Nicole. - In: AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING AND AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY. - ISSN 1748-8842. -
ELETTRONICO. - 8(2018).
Original








This article is copyright Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here:
http://iris.polito.it
Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the .
(Article begins on next page)
This article is made available under terms and conditions as specified in the  corresponding bibliographic description in
the repository
Availability:
This version is available at: 11583/2705170 since: 2020-07-09T16:04:45Z
Emerald Publishing Limited
Preliminary  Reliability  and  Safety  Assessment  Methodology  
for  Trans-­Atmospheric  Transportation  Systems  
Abstract  
Purpose  –  The  paper  aims  at  proposing  a  methodology  for  a  Safety  and  Reliability  Assessment  for  the  conceptual  and  
preliminary  design  of  very  complex  and  disrupting-­innovative  systems  like  trans-­atmospheric  vehicles  are.  The  proposed  
methodology   differs   from   existing   ones   because   does   not   rely   on   statistical   data   at   aircraft-­level   but   it   exploits   the  
statistical  population  at  components-­level  only.  For  the  sake  of  clarity,  the  paper  provides  some  preliminary  results  of  the  
application  of   the  methodology  at  system-­level.  The  example  deals  with   the  safety  and   reliability  assessment  of  a  very  
complex  propulsion  system  aimed  at  guaranteeing  Vertical  Take-­Off  and  Landing  capabilities  of  a  suborbital  vehicle.    
Design/methodology/approach  –  The  proposed  methodology  is  strongly  based  on  a  Systems  Engineering  approach.  It  
exploits  safety  and   reliability  assessment  analyses  which  have  already  been  developed   in  both  aeronautical  and  space  
engineering  domains,  but   it  combines   them  in  an   innovative  way   to  overcome  the   lack  of  statistics  at  aircraft   level.  The  
methodology   consists   of   two   different   steps:   a   qualitative   top-­down   process,   allowing   a   functional   and   physical  
decomposition   of   the   transportation   system   and   a   following   quantitative   bottom-­up   approach,   which   provides   the  
estimation  of  System-­level  reliability  and  safety  characteristics  starting  from  the  statistical  estimation  of  the  components’  
characteristics.  
Findings   –   The   paper   presents   a   new  methodology   for   the   preliminary   reliability   and   safety   assessment   of   innovative  
transportation  systems,  like  hypersonic  ones,  since  the  conceptual  design  phase,  overcoming  the  big  problem  of  lack  of  
statistical  data.  
Research  limitations/implications  –  The  paper  shows  the  application  of  the  articulated  methodology  to  a  limited  case-­
study.  A  complete  example  of  application  of   the  methodology   to  estimate  safety  and  reliability  characteristics  at  vehicle  
level  will  be  provided  in  feature  works.  
Practical   implications  –  The  methodology  has  been  proposed  to  be  exploited   in   international  research  activities   in   the  
field  of  hypersonic   transportation  systems.  Furthermore,  a  massive  application  of   this  approach  would  allow  to  create  a  
database   for   the   generation   and   the   update   of   semi-­empirical   models   focused   on   high-­level   estimations   of   Reliability,  
Availability,   Maintainability   and   Safety   (RAMS)   characteristics.   Moreover,   the   proposed   safety   assessment   has   been  
conceived  to  be  fully  integrated  within  a  typical  conceptual  design  process.    
Originality/value   –  The  existing   literature   about   safety   and   reliability   assessment   at   the   early   design   stages  proposes  
pure  statistical  approaches  which  are  usually  not  applicable  to  highly  innovative  products,  where  the  statistical  population  
is  not  existing,   like,   for  example,   in   the  case  of   trans-­atmospheric  vehicles.  This  paper  describes  how   to  overcome   this  
problem,   through   the   exploitation   of   statistical   data   at   components-­level   only   through   the   combination   of   these  data   to  
estimate   RAMS   characteristics   at   aircraft-­level   thanks   to   functional   analysis,   concept   of   operations   and   typical   safety  
assessment  tools,  like  Functional  Hazard  Analysis,  Failure  Mode  and  Effect  Analysis,  Reliability  Block  Diagram  and  Fault  
Tree  Analysis.  
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Introduction  
Hypersonic  transportation  systems  are  becoming  the  joining  ring  between  space  and  aeronautical  domains  from  both  
the   industrial   and   the   research   activities   perspectives   (Tauri   Group,   2012).   Lot   of   efforts   are   currently   employed   by  
different  research  centres  and  agencies  and  also  from  academia.  
From   the   one   hand,   the   possibility   of   proofing   structures   and  materials   able   to   survive   very   extreme  environmental  
conditions  like  the  ones  experienced  in  a  hypersonic  flight  is  of  absolute  interest  for  space  industries.  These  capabilities  
can  be  exploited  in  several  missions  implying  a  re-­entry  manoeuvre  on  Earth  but  also  on  other  planets  or  celestial  bodies.  
From  the  other  hand,  looking  at  the  problem  from  aeronautical  perspective,  the  capability  of  reaching  hypersonic  speeds  
is  fascinating  designers,  companies  and  also  passengers,  especially  because  of  the  envisaged  drastic  reduction  in  flight  
duration  due  to  the  maximum  achievable  speed.    
In  the   last  decade,  not  only  national  or  governmental  agencies  showed  their   interest   in   these  topics  but  also  several  
private  stakeholders  are  trying  to  develop  their  own  transportation  system.  In  particular,  many  of  these  visionaries  are  not  
only   focusing   on   long-­haul   missions   but   also   to   provide   touristic   flight   services   to   allow   passengers   experiencing  
microgravity  and  an  amazing  view  of  the  Earth  curvature  as  well  as  the  possibility,  for  the  scientific  community,  to  exploit  
this  service  to  perform  microgravity  tests.    
From   the   technical   point   of   view,   suborbital   parabolic   flights   are   characterized   by   a   lower   level   of   complexity   with  
respect  to  the  hypersonic  missions  and,  for  this  reason,  the  related  vehicles  are  considered  as  test-­bed  for  different  kind  
of  enabling  technologies  (Santoro  et  al.,  2014).  Moreover,  ad-­hoc  vehicles  designed  for  parabolic  suborbital  flights  can  be  
considered   themselves   the   short-­term   goal   of   a   technology   development   roadmap   (Cresto   et.   al,   2016)   aimed   at   the  
reaching  the  routine  operations  of  a  hypersonic  crew  transportation  system.  
In  any  of  these  enterprises,  considering  the  fact  that  they  are  dealing  with  really  disrupting  technologies,  special  focus  
should  be  devoted  to  ensure  a  reasonable  level  of  safety  to  the  crew,  the  flight  participants,  the  on-­ground  personnel  and  
to  all  non-­involved  people.   It   is  mainly   for   this  reason  that   it   is  very   important   to   take  safety   into  account  since  the  very  
beginning  of   the  design  process.   In  both  aeronautics  and  space   tradition,   the  very   first   rough  estimations  of   the  vehicle  
failure   rates   and   the   allocation   of   this   value   on   the   systems   is   mainly   based   on   historical   data.   However,   in   case   of  
spaceplanes,  these  approaches  cannot  be  anymore  exploited  due  to  the  lack  of  useful  statistical  population.  This  paper  
tries   to   overcome   this   problem,   proposing   a   two-­steps   methodology   consisting   in   a   sequence   of   qualitative   and  
quantitative  evaluations  that  can  enable  to  perform  a  safety  assessment  at  conceptual  design  level.    
In  addition,   the  paper  provides  an  example  of   the  application  of   the  approach  to   the  design  of  a  complex  propulsion  
system  aimed  at  guaranteeing  the  fulfilment  of  vertical  take-­off  and  landing  requirements  and  powering  a  spaceplane  up  
to  a  target  altitude  of  100  km.    
Section  Safety  Assessment  Methodology  aims  at  describing  the  methodology  with  a  step-­by  step  approach,  pointing  
out   possible   ways   to   integrate   these   analyses   within   the   currently   exploited   conceptual   and   preliminary   design  
methodologies.  Then,  before  starting  with  the  application  of  this  process  to  the  evaluation  of  the  safety  levels  of  a  peculiar  
propulsion  system  for  VTOL  spaceplane,  the  Section  Vertical  Take  Off  and  Landing  Strategy  provides  a  brief  description  
of  the  reference  mission  and  vehicle  highlighting  the  different  strategies  to  ensure  Vertical  Take-­Off  and  Landing  (VTOL)  
capabilities,   justifying  the  selected  architecture  and  pointing  out  the  main  reasons  why  this  one  is  so  deeply  affected  by  
safety  considerations.  Then,  Section  Integrated  Methodology  shows  the  way  in  which  this  approach  has  been  followed  for  
the  definition  of  the  above-­mentioned  propulsion  system  architecture,  providing  also  some  preliminary  quantitative  results.  
Eventually,  the  integration  of  the  methodology  within  a  proper  Model  Based  Systems  Engineering  tool-­chain  is  proposed  
as  future  development  of  this  study.  
Safety  Assessment  Methodology  
Considering   (NASA,   2014),   Safety   can   be   defined   as:   freedom   from   those   conditions   that   can   cause   death,   injury,  
occupational  illness,  damage  to  or  loss  of  equipment  or  property,  or  damage  to  the  environment.  In  any  given  application,  
the  specific  scope  of  safety  must  be  clearly  defined  by  the  stakeholders  in  terms  of  the  entities  to  which  it  applies  and  the  
consequences  against  which  it   is  assessed.  For  example,  for  non-­reusable  and/or  non-­recoverable  systems,  damage  to  
or  loss  of  equipment  may  be  meaningful  only  insofar  as  it  translates  into  degradation  or  loss  of  mission  objectives.  
It  is  not  possible  to  deal  with  vehicles  of  mission  100%  safe  but  in  the  real  world  it  is  necessary  to  accept  a  certain  degree  
of   risk.   From   this   consideration,   the   principle   of   being   As   Safe   As   Reasonably   Practicable   (ASARP)   has   also   been  
derived.   Always   referring   to   (NASA,   2014),   a   determination   that   a   system   is   ASARP   entails   weighing   its   safety  
performance  against  the  sacrifice  needed  to  further  improve  it.  
In  this  context,  System  Reliability  and  Safety  techniques  have  been  developed.    
Before  entering  in  the  detail  of  the  integrated  methodology,  the  following  subsections  aim  at  describing  the  main  tools.  It  is  
worth  to  notice  that   it  consists  of  very  well-­known  tools  currently  used  in  both  aeronautical  and  space  domains  (Chiesa,  
2010),  (Chiesa  et  al.,  2013),  (Viscio  et  al.  2014),  (Viscio  et  al.  2015).  
Considering   the   typical   aeronautical   approach,   safety   assessment   methodologies   provide   engineers   with   proper  
knowledge  and  tools  to  carry  out  a-­posteriori  checks  in  order  to  verify  the  compliance  of  the  already  completed  design  to  
the  high   level  safety  requirements  (from  regulations  or   from  stakeholders).   In   the   last  decades,   this  approach  has  been  
abandoned   and   a-­priori   evaluations   have   been   preferred.   For   this   reason,   several   methodologies   suitable   to   design  
reliable  and  safety  systems  allowing  RAMS  estimations  since  the  beginning  of  the  design  process,  have  been  proposed.    
On   the   other   hand,   safety   design   has   ever   been   considered   a   crucial   topic   in   space   transportation   (Musgrave,   2009),  
(Stamatelatos  et.  al,  2011)  and  especially  for  the  mission  including  humans  on-­board.  New  Probabilistic  Risk  Assessment  
methodologies  have  been  developed  since   the  Space  Shuttle  era  and  are  currently   in-­depth  evaluated  with   the  aim  of  
increasing  the  public  consensus  on  reusable  space  transportation  systems  and  on  space  commercialization.  
The  proposed  methodology  is  based  on  the  exploitation  of  the  tools  developed  and  used  in  both  aeronautical  and  space  
domains  but  arranged  within  a  dual  process  that  would  allow  at   first,   to  use  these  tools  to  formalize  the  structure  of   the  
system  (from  reliability  standpoint)  and  then,  to  derive  the  characteristic  value  of  the  system,  starting  from  assumptions  on  
the  basic  elements  of  the  tree.    
System  safety  is  considered  a  proper  discipline  (NASA,  2014),  directly  derived  by  the  application  of  systems  engineering  
approach   and  management   principles,   criteria,   and   techniques   to   optimize   safety   within   the   constraints   of   operational  
effectiveness,   time,   and   cost   throughout   all   phases   of   the   system   life   cycle.   For   this   reason,   in   this   paper,   the   author  
proposes  an  integrated  methodology  that  allows  to  take  safety  into  account  since  the  beginning  of  the  design  process  and  
in  a  harmonized  way  with   the   rest  of   the  usual  design  activities.  Thus,   the  suggested   tools  are   typically   those   typically  
used  to  perform  a  high-­level  safety  assessment  in  conceptual  design.  However,  this  paper  suggests  an  innovative  way  to  
connect  all  these  tools  within  a  well-­defined  and  structured  conceptual  design  methodology.  As  it  will  be  discussed  later,  
this   is   the   first   step   to   reach   the  complete  automation  of   this  process,   since   the  aim  of   translating   it   in  a  Model  Based  
Systems  Engineering  (MBSE)  Methodology   is  envisaged.   In  particular,   the  selection  of   tools  (not  only  software  but  also  
diagram  etc…)  and  the  proper  sequence  by  which  they  are  used,  i.e.  the  tool  chain,  can  be  the  most  relevant  difference  
between  the  ARP  4761  and  the  methodology  proposed  in  this  paper.  
An  Integrated  Safety  Design  Methodology  
As  it  was  announced  above,  the  here  proposed  methodology  consists  of  two  major  parts:  
1.   A   Qualitative   Analysis   where,   starting   from   the   top-­level   design   activities,   a   safety   assessment   is   performed  
following   a   top-­down   approach,   from   the   mission   level   to   the   equipment   level.   This   process   does   not   imply   any  
quantitative  evaluations.  
2.   A  Quantitative  Analysis  where,  starting  from  the  results  of  the  Qualitative  Analysis,  exploiting  available  statistics  at  
equipment  level  and  following  a  bottom-­up  approach,  it  is  possible  to  retrace  the  way  to  derive  the  probability  of  the  top-­
event  related  to  the  mission  or  to  the  system.  
The  following  subsections  aim  at  describing  into  details  the  two  parts  of  the  methodologies,  highlighting  its  intrinsic  feature  
of  being  fully  integrated  within  a  modern  conceptual  design  activity  based  on  a  Systems  Engineering  approach.  
Qualitative  Process  
This  subsection  aims  at  providing  a  detailed  description  of  the  sequence  of  actions  summarized  in  Fig.  3.  This  first  part  of  
the  methodology  aims  at  deriving  the  basic  elements  composing  the  high-­level  system,  starting  from  the  identification  of  
all  the  possible  people  and  public  or  private  entities  interested  in  the  design  of  the  innovative  aerospace  product  and  in  all  
the  possible  advantages  coming  out  from  its  exploitation.  
It  should  be  noticed  that  the  very  first  step,  i.e.  the  Stakeholder  analysis,  coincides  with  the  usual  starting  activity  of  each  
conceptual   design   of   innovative   products,   consisting   in   looking   for   all   possible   interested   private   or   public   entities   and  
trying   to  evaluate   their   needs.  At   the   same   time,   as   soon  as   the  product   category  has  been  defined,   it   is   important   to  
deeply   investigate   the  market,   in  order   to  understand  where   to  sell   the  product  and  also   to  evaluate   if   the   technologies  
that  should  be  developed  for  this  application  can  be  interesting  in  different  fields.  Moreover,  a  review  of  the  national  and  
international  regulations  related  to  the  development  but  also  to  the  operations  of  the  vehicle  should  be  considered  and  a  
first  draft  list  of  constraint  can  arise.  
From   this  preliminary  analysis,  a  mission  statement  and  consequently  a   first   list  of  objectives  and   requirements  can  be  
derived.  At  this  point  it   is  possible  to  concretely  starts  the  safety  assessment  creating  a  simple  Functional  Tree  (Chiesa,  
2010).  Within  the  conceptual  design  phase,  with  a  Systems  Engineering  approach,  Functional  Trees  are  used  to  look  at  
the   system   from   a   broader   functional   perspective,   allowing   to   derive   all   the   functionalities   or   capabilities   the   System  
should  guarantee  to  fulfil  the  main  objectives.  While  these  functions  are  on  one  side  associated  to  subsystems,  equipment  
and  components  able  to  perform  these  functions,  they  can  also  on  the  other  side  be  exploited  as  inputs  to  carry  out  the  
Functional  Hazard  Assessment  (FHA)  at  aircraft  level.    
Functional  Hazard  Assessment   is  a   logical  examination  of   functions   to   identify  and  classify   failure  conditions   related   to  
those   functions   according   to   their   severity   (SAE,   1996).   The   objective   of   the  FHA   is   to   consider   functions   at   the  most  
appropriate   level   and   to   identify   failure   conditions   and   the   associated   classifications   while   considering   both   loss   of  
functionalities  and  malfunctions.  It  is  important  to  notice  that  the  FHA,  especially  if  carried  out  at  system  or  at  lower  levels,  
should  identify  the  failure  conditions  for  each  phase  of  flight  when  the  failure  effects  and  classifications  vary  from  one  flight  
phase   to  another.  The  FHA  also  allows   to  derive   safety   requirements  needed   to   limit   the   function   failure  effects  which  
affect   the   failure   condition   classification.  Once   the   high   level   requirements   have   been   identified,   they  may   be   used   to  
generate   lower   level   requirements.   As  well   as   for   all   the   other   categories   of   requirements,   this   process   shall   continue  
iteratively,  until  the  design  process  is  complete.  The  most  common  and  useful  way  to  perform  a  FHA  is  to  create  a  table  
view  where  this  data  can  be  organized,  as  part  of  the  Preliminary  System  Safety  Assessment  process  for  the  systems  or  
items.    
It   is  worth   to  notice   that   in  Figure  3,  where   the  overall  process   is  shown,   there  are   two   levels  of  FHA,   the  Aircraft   level  
FHA  and  the  System-­Subsystem  level  FHA.  Indeed,  the  FHA  will  be  carried  out  at  different  levels  of  the  design  process  
but  exploiting  the  same  principles.  
Coming  back  to  aircraft  level,  once  the  functional  tree  and  FHA  have  been  derived,  each  failure  condition  identified  by  the  
FHA  should  become  the  top-­event  of  a  Fault  Tree.  
Fault  Tree  Analysis  is  a  deductive,  failure-­based  approach  that  starts  with  an  undesired  event  (called  top  event)  and  then  
logically  determines  (deduces)  its  causes  using  a  systematic,  top-­down  approach.  In  determining  the  causes,  a  Fault  Tree  
(FT)  (Figure  1)  is  constructed  as  a  logical  illustration  of  the  events  and  their  relationships  that  are  necessary  and  sufficient  
to  result  in  the  top  event.  To  carry  out  FTA,  a  real  tree  consisting  in  boxes  and  connectors  should  be  built.  In  particular,  
the  types  of  boxes  used  identify  the  different  kind  of  events,  while  the  different  connectors  stand  for  the  Boolean  algebraic  
symbols  (“AND”  and  “OR”)  should  be  used  to  specify  the  relationships  among  the  several  events.  
The  FT  is  a  qualitative  model  but  provides  extremely  useful  information  on  the  causes  of  the  undesired  event.  The  FT  can  
also  be  quantified  to  provide  useful  information  on  the  probability  of  the  top  event  occurring  and  the  importance  of  all  the  
causes  and  events  modelled  in  the  FT.  
  In  this  way,  a  FTA  can  be  carried  out  taking  into  account  that  each  basic  event  of  all  the  FTs  will  become  the  new  failure  
condition   for  a  specific   function  of  a   lower   level  FHA.  Moreover,   following   the  procedure  explained   for   the  aircraft-­level  
FHA,  this  lower-­level  FHA  should  also  receive  inputs  from  Functional  Tree  carried  out  for  the  relative  design  level.  
Then,  to  continue  in  the  analysis,   it   is  necessary   to  move  from  a  strict   functional  view  of   the  system  to  a  more  product-­
based  stand  point.  This   is  usually  performed  within   the  design  procedure  based  on  SE  approach,   linking   the   results  of  
product  trees  (Chiesa,  2010)  with  the  possible  way  of  working  of  the  system  itself  or  its  behavior  during  its  operative  life,  
creating   the   so   called   Concept   of   Operations.   The   Concept   of   Operations   allows   describing   how   the   system   will   be  
operated   during   its   entire   life   cycle,   in   order   to   achieve   the  mission   objectives.   Typical   analyses   contained   in  ConOps  
include  evaluations  of  mission  phases,  operation   timelines,  operational  scenarios,  end-­to-­end  communications  strategy,  
command  and  data  architecture,  operational  facilities,  integrated  logistic  support  and  critical  events.    
Carefully  evaluating  the  results  of  the  Concept  of  Operations  analysis  and  taking  into  account  the  results  of  the  functional  
analysis,   the  Reliability  Block  Diagrams  (RBDs)  can  be  derived.  Reliability  Block  Diagrams  are  graphical   representation  
used   to   reproduce   the  way  of  working  of  a  certain  system  or  subsystem   in  a  well-­defined  mission  phase  and  operative  
mode.   Indeed,   depending   on   the   operative   modes,   the   system   could   be   schematically   represented   through   different  
layouts.  Exploiting  existing  reliability  theories,  it  is  possible  to  translate  the  scheme  in  an  algebraic  equation  in  which  the  
known  values  are  the  failure  rates  of   the  different  components  and  the  unknown  parameter   is   the  system  or  subsystem  
Reliability.  
Figure  1          Example  of  Fault  Tree  (left)  and  Reliability  Block  Diagram  (right)  
     
  
Figure  2          Example  of  FHA  (left)  and  FMEA  (right)  
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Then,  on  the  one  hand,  each  component  of  the  RBD  can  be  in  depth  evaluated  from  the  safety  stand  point  exploiting  the  
Failure  Modes   and   Effects   Analysis   (FMEA),   while   on   the   other   hand,   the  way   in   which   the   different   components   are  
mutually  interfaced  will  define  the  logic  operators  of  the  related  Fault  Tree.    
The  Failure  Modes  and  Effects  Analysis  is  a  systematic  analysis  of  the  way  in  which  each  subsystem  or  components  can  
be  affected  by  malfunctions,   thus  behaving  differently   if   compared   to  what   it  was  expected   in  nominal  mode.  For  each  
type  of   failure,   this  analysis  allows   to   induce   the  effect   related   to   this   failure   that   could  be  experienced  by   the  system.  
Then,   starting   from   the   failure   modes   and   from   the   possible   causes   of   these   mishaps,   the   failure   effects   and   its  
seriousness   can  be  estimated.  Similar   to  what   has  been  presented   in   the  previous   subsections,   also   in   this   case,   it   is  
possible  to  exploit  this  tool  in  an  iterative  way  in  order  to  obtain  at  each  step,  a  new  set  of  more  detailed  information.  
At  the  lowest  level  of  decomposition  (equipment  level)  the  failure  effects  of  the  FMEA  are  the  basic  events  of  the  FTA.  
Eventually,  this  first  part  of  the  methodology  will  be  used  to  derive  the  functional  and  behavioural  structure  of  the  system,  
reaching  a  decomposition  sufficiently  low  level  such  that  it  is  possible  to  assign  numerical  values  of  failure  rates  to  each  
basic  component.  This  will  be  the  first  activity  of  the  quantitative  methodology  (bottom-­up  approach),  in-­depth  analysed  in  
subsection   “Quantitative  process”   that  would   lead   to   the  estimation  of  an  aircraft   level   failure   rate   to  be  compared  with  
existing  regulation  and/or  high  level  constraints.  
  
Quantitative  Process  
Once   the   activities   described   in   the   previous   section   have   been   completed,   the   quantitative   analysis   can   start.   The  
process   is   summarized   in   Figure   4  where   the   process   followed   should   be   read   from   bottom   to   the   upper   part.   At   the  
beginning,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  lowest  event  that  could  occur  (i.e.  the  event  related  to  a  malfunctioning  of  one  of  
the  lowest-­level  identified  component)  and  the  smallest  identified  components  of  the  system  and  associate  the  probability  
of   occurrences   to   each   of   them.   It   is   important   to   notice   that   at   the   beginning   of   this   process,   a   deep   analysis   and  
research  of  available  statistics  shall  be  conducted.  Then,  it  is  reasonable  to  proceed  with  a  bottom-­up  approach  aimed  at  
solving  the  aforementioned  probability  equations,  reaching  the  top-­level  event  as  graphically  summarized  in  Figure  4.  In  
particular,  the  quantitative  process  exploits  all  the  Fault  Trees  previously  derived  in  the  qualitative  process,  starting  from  
the  lowest  level  until  reaching  the  aircraft-­level  Fault  Tree.    
Exploiting   a   similar   approach,   in   addition   to   the   Top   Event   Probability,   estimations   of   Mission   Reliability   can   also   be  
carried  out,  solving  the  Reliability  Block  Diagrams  derived  for  each  mission  phase.    
  
  








Case  Study:  estimation  of  the  reliability  characteristics  of  a  complex  propulsion  system  aimed  
at  supporting  VTOL  capabilities    
Reference  mission  and  vehicle  description  
The  paper  suggests  a  methodology  for  a  preliminary  safety  assessment  with  a  special  focus  on  the  analysis  of  a  crucial  
propulsion   system.   In   order   to   contextualize   the   peculiar   type   of   application   selected,   the   mission   statement   is   here  
reported.    
“The  mission  shall  allow  regular   flight  services   to  enable  4   flight  participants  at  a   time  to  reach  100  km  to  experience  a  
period  of  microgravity  and  an  amazing  view  of  the  Earth.  The  spacecraft  shall  perform  a  vertical  take-­off  from  a  sea-­based  
or   land-­based   platform   and   a   vertical   landing   on   the   same   site.  Moreover,   the   additional   capability   to   perform   an   un-­
crewed  mission  shall  be  considered”.  
This  mission  statement  refers  to  a  pre-­feasibility  study  granted  to  an  Italian  small  enterprise  (ALTEC  S.p.A)  and  carried  
out   involving  Politecnico  di  Torino,  which   the  author  belongs   to,  and  Thales  Alenia  Space   Italy   (in  particular  a   team  of  
experts  of  the  Turin  site)  by  a  private  Malaysian  Stakeholder.  The  results  of  mission  analysis  and  prefeasibility  study  have  
been  already  presented  in  (Viola  et  al.,  2015)  and  (Fusaro  et  al.,  2016),  where  further  details  can  be  found.  
Among  the  primary  objectives,  it  is  crystal  clear  that  the  stakeholders’  expectations  of  having  a  suborbital  vehicle  able  to  
vertically   take-­off   and   landing   will   severely   affect   the   vehicle   layout   and   on-­board   systems   integration,   as   well   as   the  
location  and  the  layout  of  the  spaceport  (Santoro  et  al.,  2015)  and  (De  Vita  et  al.,  2015)  (Figure  5).  
The  mission  statement  clearly  identifies  VTOL  capability  as  one  on  the  major  stakeholders  needs.  Moreover,  considering  
the  high  impact  of  this  requirement  on  the  vehicle  layout  and  mission  strategy,  it  is  important  to  take  it  into  account  since  
the   beginning   of   the   design   process   but   also   to   properly   select   the   propulsion   system   strategy   and   architecture.   In  
addition,   in  order   to  comply  with  Malaysian  regulations,   the  mission  shall  not  envisage  a  rocket  powered   lift-­off  but  only  
conventional  air-­breathing  engines  could  be  exploited  up  to  a  certain  altitude.  
The  very  preliminary  trade-­off  studies  have  been  carried  out  and  both  the  processes,  selection  criteria  and  results  related  
to   this   reference   case   study   are   reported   in   (Fusaro   et   al.,   2016).   Among   hundreds   of   alternatives,   a   winged   body  
configuration  has  been  selected  (Figure  6)  as   the  most  suitable   to  carry  non-­trained  passengers  guaranteeing  a  proper  
level  of   comfort   and  safety  during   the  entire   flight  envelope.   Indeed,   this   configuration   is   the  most   suitable   for  a   single  
stage-­to-­orbit,   enabling   passengers   to   free-­float   during   microgravity   experience   and   to   integrate   a   detachable   cabin  
escape  system.    
  
  




Figure  6          Reference  vehicle  layout  
  
Trade-­off  among  possible  propulsion  systems  architectures  for  assisting  VTOL  
The  need  for  a  vehicle  able   to  comply  with  VTOL  requirements   is  strictly   related   to  economic   feasibility  studies.  On  the  
one   hand,   the   VTOL   capability   guarantees   several   advantages,   as,   for   example,   the   low   impact   on   the   on-­ground  
infrastructures.   Indeed,   in   order   to  make   such   a   spaceplane   operative,   long   runways   are   not   required   anymore   and   a  
smaller  confined  area  could  be  sufficient.  In  particular,  this  advantage  is  optimized  in  the  case  of  a  non-­tail-­sitting  take-­off  
since   a   simple   pad   or   clear   area   could   be   sufficient   to   perform   a   take-­off   and   no   launch   tower   should   be   required.  
Consequently,   a   higher   number   of   locations   would   be   theoretically   able   to   host   the   vehicle.   Unfortunately,   this   is   not  
completely  applicable  to  this  kind  of  vehicles,  especially  if  they  use  rocket  technology  that  implies  to  store  also  dangerous  
explosive   propellant   on-­board.   The   infrastructure   location   should   be   properly   selected   depending   on   environmental,  
population  and  logistic  constraints.  
In  opposition   to   the  higher   flexibility   guaranteed  by  VTOL  vehicles,   a   very  high   level   of   complexity,   postponed   time-­to-­
market  and  additional  costs  should  be  properly  taken  into  account.    
In   the   following   subsection,   different  ways   to  ensure  VTOL  capabilities  are   reported  and   two  major   alternatives  are   in-­
depth   analysed.   It   is   worth   noting   that   the   research   group   of   Politecnico   di   Torino,   which   the   authors   belong   to,   had  
already  dealt  with  VTOL  capabilities,  also  for  different  kind  of  innovative  vehicles  (Chiesa  et  al.,  2014)  
Non-­Tail-­Sitting  Strategy  
As   it   has   been  mentioned   in   the   previous   subsection,   the  VTOL   strategy   has   always   been   considered   to   be   the  most  
desirable   feature   from   operational   standpoints,   but   due   to   the   high   level   of   complexity   of   the   solution,   the   need   of  
containing  weight  to  be  competitive  and  of  maintaining  the  level  of  performances  of  the  Horizontal  Take  Off  and  Landing  
(HOTOL)  vehicles,  this  traduces  in  a  real  nightmare  for  the  designers.  
In  particular,   in  the  next  subsection  two  different  propulsion  systems  architectures  have  been  analysed  in  order  to  show  
three   main   existing   strategies   that   could   be   adopted   for   the   proposed   case   study.   The   examples   are   taken   from   the  
military  field  where  the  need  of  taking  off  and  landing  in  unprepared  and  narrow  areas  is  frequently  considered  to  be  the  
added  value  of  the  vehicle.  It   is  worth  to  notice  that  these  descriptions  do  not  pretend  to  be  propulsion  system  technical  
dissertation,  being  instead  conceived  to  explain  the  reader  which  components  they  comprehend,  which  are  the  main  topic  
related   to   their   integration  with   the  other  aircraft  subsystems  and  how   the  overall  system  works.  Due   to   the  aim  of   this  
paper,  the  feasibility  of  these  options  for  a  hypersonic  spaceplane  is  also  discussed.  
Steerable  nozzles  and  lift  engines  (Yak  38–like  architecture)  
The   first  propulsion  system  architecture  here  proposed   is   the  one  exploited  by   the  Russian  Yakovlev  Yak  38,  which   is  
based  on   two  separate  subsystems.   Indeed,   the  main  engine,  entirely  contained  within   the   fuselage,  has   two  steerable  
nozzles  able  to  direct  downward  the  hot  gasses  during  the  take-­off  and  landing  phases.  As  it  possible  to  notice  in  Figure  
7,  due  to  the  distance  of  the  nozzles  from  the  Centre  of  Gravity  (CG)  of  the  overall  configuration  at  take-­off,  at   least  an  
additional   thrust   point   should   be   added   in   the   forepart   of   the   fuselage.   To   solve   this   problem   two   secondary   engines,  
called  lift-­engines,  were  added  in  order  to  be  exploited  only  during  take-­off  and  landing  phases.  Considering  the  studies  
performed  by  Raymer  (2006)  the  so-­called  “lift  plus  lift/cruise”  (L+L/C)  approach  may  be  the  best  in  class  for  supersonic  
VTOL  aircraft.  Indeed,  this  solution  proposes  to  use  the  lift  of  the  main  engine  plus  the  extra  lift  of  the  lift  engines,  deleting  
the   need   for   a   compromise   with   the   “normal”   mission,   because   the   main   engine   is   always   the   same   (apart   from   the  
steerable  nozzles).  As  it  is  clearly  sketched  in  Figure  7,  these  engines  receive  air  from  the  inlets  placed  in  the  upper  part  
of   the   fuselage   and   they   directly   discharge   the   hot   gasses   downward.   Please   notice   that   four   small   doors   have   been  
designed  to  cover  both  inlets  and  outlets  in  order  to  avoid  the  structural  discontinuities  and  the  undesired  air-­flow  in  the  
intakes  during  the  other  mission  phases.  Moreover,  the  presence  of  these  two  lift  engines  implies  the  creation  of  two  split  
lateral  intakes  to  feed  the  main  engine.  In  addition  to  the  main  thrust  produced  by  hot  gasses,  a  proper  distribution  system  
has  been  envisaged  to  enhance  the  stability  of  the  configuration.  It  is  worth  to  notice  that  this  L+L/C  configuration  has  a  
safety  related  issue:  in  case  a  lift  engine  should  fail  during  vertical  flight  or  in  transition,  the  aircraft  may  lose  its  stability  
immediately,  with  a   fast  pitch  down  movement.  This   is   the   reason  why   the  Yak  38  had  been  designed  with  an  ejection  
system   to   be   exploited   also   at   take-­off.   To   increase   the   stability   of   this   configuration,   rearward   vectoring   should   be  
hypothesized  also  for  the  two  lift  engines:  in  this  case,  they  could  also  be  used  to  assist  a  return  base  mission  if  a  cruise  
engine  would  fail.  
It  is  clear  that  this  kind  of  solution  avoids  the  duplication  of  the  main  propulsion  system  to  fulfil  the  take-­off  requirement  in  
terms  of  thrust,  allowing  mass  and  fuel  savings  and  maintaining  a  compact  configuration.  However,  the  presence  of  the  
two  lift  engines  creates  a  non-­negligible  interruption  of  the  airframe  and  this  could  be  hardly  accepted  for  spaceplanes  due  
to  their  very  high  speed  and  critical  operative  environment.  On  the  other  hand,  the  exploitation  of  steerable  nozzles  and  
devices  for  enhancing  stability  will  be  taken  into  account  for  the  case  study.  
Lift  fan  and  steerable  nozzle  (F-­35–like  architecture)  
The  second  analysed  solution  is  the  one  adopted  on-­board  the  F-­35B  and  it  is  known  as  “Shaft-­Driven  Lift  Fan”  (SDLF).  
From  the  balance  of  forces  standpoint,  also  this  configuration  can  be  basically  considered  as  a  L+L/C,  but  the  lift-­engines  
are   here   replaced   by   a   fan   directly   connected   to  main   engine   shaft.   The   overall   configuration   consists   of   a   jet   engine  
compressor  mechanically  spun  by  a  driveshaft   that   is  spun  by  an  extra   turbine.  Of  course,  during  cruise,  a  clutch  shall  
allow  to  disconnect  the  fan  from  the  main  engine,  allowing  the  unloaded  turbine  to  spin  freely.  When  the  fan  is  engaged,  
the  mechanical  power   is  extracted   from   the  engine  exhaust  and   it   is  applied   to  a   larger  amount  of  air  allowing  a   thrust  
augmentation  factor  that  can  reach  1.4  times  (Raymer,  2006).  With  respect  to  the  configuration  proposed  in  the  previous  
subsection,  SDLF   inherits   the  main  benefits  avoiding   the  higher   temperatures  of   separated   lift   engines  and   the   related  
maintenance   activities.   On   the   other   side,   an   increase   in   complexity   should   be   taken   into   account   considering   the  
additional  components  of  the  architecture,  such  as  shaft,  clutch,  gearbox  and  an  extra-­turbine.  
Harrier-­like  
Dealing   with   VTOL,   it   is   not   possible   to   forget   the   AV-­8   Harrier   aircraft.   It   uses   the   high-­bypass   ratio   engine   called  
Pegasus   in  which   the   fan   air   and   the   core   air   are   separately   vectored   through   “elbow”   nozzles.   It   is   clear   that   such   a  
solution   simplifies   transition  and  enhance   the  manoeuvrability   of   the  aircraft,   especially   during   low   speed  manoeuvres.  
The  most  important  drawback  of  this  system  is  the  fact  that  there  is  a  single  engine  that  should  be  able  to  generate  the  
required   lift   in   each   single  mission   phases.   This   is   the   so-­called   “matching   problem”.   For   stability   reasons,   the   engine  
should  be  placed  pretty  closed  to  the  CG  and  this  can  imply  an  increase  of  the  cross-­sectional  area  in  coincidence  with  
the  wing  fuselage  connection,  increasing  the  supersonic  wave  drag.    
  





Case  Study:  Reference  System  Architecture  
The   present   case   study   refers   to   the  Mission  Statement   proposed   in   the   previous   section.   As   it   is   clearly   sketched   in  
Figure  6,  the  need  of  fulfilling  the  very  peculiar  mission  objectives  and  the  constrains  about  the  minimum  altitude  required  
for  the  rockets  ignition  forced  the  designers  to  conceive  a  very  complex  propulsion  system  consisting  of  two  air-­breathing  
engines  and  related  subsystems  and  a  liquid  rocket  engine.  For  the  sake  of  clarity,  Figure  5  and  Table  1  have  been  added  
in  the  previous  section   in  order  to  synthetize  the  mission  main  phases  and  the  way  in  which  the  propulsion  system  has  
been  envisage  to  work  in  the  different  phases.  Figure  8  summarizes  the  main  components  of  two  main  subsystems.  As  far  
as   the   air-­breathing   is   concerned,   the   system   is   composed   of   two   main   engines,   each   of   which   should   be   able   to  
guarantee  the  thrust  required  to  overcome  the  Maximum  Take-­Off  Weight  (MTOW)  enabling  the  VTOL  capability.  Due  to  
the   shape   of   the   vehicle   in   which   they   should   be   accommodated   and   the   presence   of   the   other   subsystems,   the   two  
engines  were  placed  on  the  two  sides  of  the  rocket  motor.  They  are  equipped  with  two  main  steerable  nozzles  but  there  is  
also   the   possibility   of   conveying   the   hot   gasses   in   a   distribution   system   to   feed   the   four   secondary   steerable   and  
retractable  nozzles  installed  in  the  lower  flat  surface  of  the  vehicle.  Two  main  fuel  tank  located  in  the  wing  available  room,  
can  feed  both  the  two  engines  through  a  cross-­feed  valve.  At   the  same  time,   for  safety  reasons,  another  cross-­valve   is  
required  in  the  hot  gasses  distribution  lines  in  order  to  allow  the  left-­hand  engine  to  provide  hot-­gasses  to  the  right-­hand  
nozzles  and  vice  versa,  in  case  of  One  Engine  Inoperative  (OEI)  condition.  In  addition,  component  like  pumps  or  valves  
should  be  obviously  taken  into  account  for  the  safety  assessment.  
The  approach  proposed  above  has  been  applied  to  identify  the  top-­event  probability  of  the  so  complex  propulsion  system  
able   to   guarantee   VTOL   capabilities.   Some   example   of   the   RBD   and   FT   are   reported   in   Figure   9   and   Figure   10  
respectively.  
Figure  8          Spaceplane  cutaway  
  
Table  1            Mission  phases  and  propulsion  system  operative  mode  
  
Mission  Phases   Operative  Mode   Comments  
Take-­off  and  transition  
     
Airbreathing  engines:  




During  take-­off  and  landing  the  air-­breathing  engines  are  exploited  
in  the  so  called  ON-­VTOL  mode.  This  means  that  they  are  active  
but   the   hot   gasses   are   diverted   into   the   downward   nozzles  
(Nozzles   3,   4,   5,   6   of   Figure   9).   Once   that   a   certain   altitude   is  
reached,   the  nozzles  are  steered   rearward   in  order   to  create   the  
required  horizontal  component  of  the  thrust  vector.  
     
        
Climb  1st  segment  
Airbreathing  engines:  




Once   the   right   attitude   is   reached,   the  air-­breathing  engines   can  
shift  to  their  nominal  operative  mode  in  which  only  Nozzle  1  and  2  
of  Figure  9  are  used.   In  order   to  prevent  undesired  airflows   from  
external,   the   four   steerable  nozzles  are   retracted  and   four   doors  
cover  the  holes,  avoiding  structural  discontinuities.  
        






At  the  ceiling  altitude  (or  even  below  if  planned)  the  air-­breathings  
should  be  switched  off  and  the  rocket  motor  is  ignited.  
        







After   the   completion   of   the   liquid   propellant,   the   rocket   motor  
burns  out  and  the  aircraft  continues  its  motion  performing  a  typical  
ballistic   parabolic   trajectory.   This   is   the   phase   in   which  
microgravity  could  be  experimented.  
        







After  the  microgravity  period,  the  air-­breathing  engines  cannot  be  
re-­started  up   to   reach   the  ceiling  altitude.  Up   to   that  altitude,   the  
aircraft   should   be   controlled   and   manoeuvred   exploiting  
secondary  propulsion  systems  (small  thrusters)      
        
        
Approach  and  landing  
Airbreathing  engines:  




During   the   approach   and   final   landing   phase,   the   air-­breathing  
engines  could  be  used  again,  in  both  nominal  and  VTOL  modes.  
        
  
Figure  9          Propulsive  system  architecture  (air-­breathing  subsystem)  
  
Figure  10          Propulsive  system  architecture  (rocket  motor  subsystem)  








It  is  clear  that  for  each  foreseen  operative  mode  of  the  propulsion  system,  a  different  RBD  and  different  FTA  have  been  
sketched.  Here  there  is  only  an  example  of  these  diagrams  derived  for  the  most  critical  phases  of  the  mission:  the  take-­
off.  As  it  is  easily  noticeable,  the  analysis  is  carried  out  considering  each  single  steerable  nozzle  placed  in  the  bottom  of  
the  vehicle  but  no  information  is  required  for  the  two  main  nozzles  since  the  overall  exhaust  mass  flow  is  diverted  in  the  
bottom  placed  ones.  Moreover,  additional  complexity  of  the  scheme  is  added  by  the  fact  that  different  kinds  of  cross-­feed  
have  been  envisaged  in  order  to  enhance  the  level  of  safety.  As  it  has  been  explained  in  the  Section  Safety  Assessment  
Methodology,  each  of   the   trees  can  be   traduced   in  an  equation   that  can  be  solved  starting   from  the   failure   rates  of   the  
single  components.  Data  coming  from  statistics  have  been  selected   in  Military  database.  This  could  be  one  of   the  main  
reasons  for  which  the  expected  propulsive  system  failure  rate  (0.009118  failures/1000h)  is  closer  to  a  fighter  than  to  a  civil  
aircraft  (Table  2)  (Chiesa,  2010).  Of  course,  this  result  is  acceptable  because  of  the  high  complexity  of  the  system.  
  
Table  2              Reference  Failure  rates  
Propulsive  system  failures  rates  [failures/1000  h]  
Fighter   Military  transportation   Civil  transportation  
0.01809   0.00226   0.0000263  
  
The   obtained   results   for   the   propulsion   system   are   in   line   with   the   expectations,   as   for   for   this   kind   of   technology,   it  
appears   to   be   realistic   to   set   safety   and   reliability   requirements   with   ranges   between   fighter   and   civil   transportation  
aircraft.  However,  these  results  have  been  obtained  considering  failure  rates  of  existing  components.  Within  an  integrated  
design  process,  these  results  highlight  the  fact  that  additional  work  should  be  carried  out  in  order  to  increase  the  reliability  
of  the  basic  components  or  of  the  entire  systems,  modifying  its  overall  architecture.  This  would  be  necessary  in  case  the  
stakeholders   or   the   regulatory   framework   would   superimpose   a   more   restrictive   requirement,   to   assimilate   suborbital  
vehicle  to  civil  aircraft.    
Eventually,   it   is   necessary   to   underline   the   fact   that   the   case-­study   here   reported,   only   represents   an   example   of  
application  of  the  proposed  methodology,  limited  at  system  level.  In  future  works,  the  application  will  be  extended  at  other  
systems,   allowing   the   possibility   of   presenting   a   complete   case-­study   with   the   ambitious   goal   of   deriving   failure   rate  
evaluation  at  aircraft  level.    
Conclusion    
This  paper  presents  a  methodology  to  carry  out  a  safety  and  reliability  assessment  suitable  for  application  to  very  complex  
and   innovative   systems   like   the   trans-­atmospheric   transportation   systems.   Unlike   existing   methodology,   this   process  
exploits  statistical  correlations  only  at  component  level,  thus  overcoming  the  problem  related  to  lack  of  statistical  data  at  
system-­level.  Starting  from  the  statistical  data  at  component  level,  it  is  possible  to  assess  reliability  and  safety  at  aircraft  
level   thanks   to   the   combination   of   typical   safety   assessment   tools,   like   Functional  Hazard  Analysis,   Failure  Mode   and  
Effect  Analysis,  Reliability  Block  Diagram  and  Fault  Tree  Analysis  on  the  basis  of  previously  carried  out  analyses  such  as  
the  functional  analysis  and  the  concept  of  operations.  It  is  therefore  fundamental  to  have  first  a  qualitative  phase  followed  
by  a  quantitative  because  the   logical  decomposition   that  comes  out   from  the  qualitative  approach  paves  the  way  of   the  
numerical  evaluations  that,  starting  from  the  bottom,  traces  back  to  the  top.  Moreover,  the  methodology  is  fully  integrated  
within   the  conceptual  design  phase  because   it  makes  use  of  some  basics   tools  of  a  systems  engineering  approach.  A  
massive  application  of  this  approach  to  different  case-­studies  will  eventually  allow  to  create  a  database  for  the  generation  
and  the  update  of  semi-­empirical  models  focused  on  high-­level  estimations  of  Reliability,  Availability,  Maintainability  and  
Safety  (RAMS)  characteristics.  
Considering  the  peculiar  application  presented  in  this  paper,  the  methodology  reveals  to  be  also  suitable  for  application  at  
systems   level.   In   particular,   the   application   to   the   reference   case-­study   strongly   confirms   the   usefulness   of   this  
methodology  to  overcome  the  problem  of  lack  of  data  that  in  this  and  many  other  cases  affect  the  accuracy  of  assessment  
of  RAMS  characteristics  at  system  level,  (considering  its  embedded  disrupting  technology  or  high  level  of  innovation).    
Further  Work  
In  the  near  future,  the  authors  will  extend  the  application  of  the  methodology  presented  in  this  paper  to  a  complete  case-­
study,  carrying  out  a  safety  and  reliability  assessment  for  the  different  systems,  with  the  aim  of  deriving  the  failure  rates  at  
aircraft  level.  In  this  way,  it  will  be  possible  to  update  the  values  of  some  parametric  coefficients  and  to  create  new  set  of  
predictive  equations  to  be  used  since  the  very  beginning  of  the  design  process.    
Moreover,  the  author  will   integrate  the  methodology  in  a  Model  Based  Systems  Engineering  environment  (Fusaro  et  al.,  
2016),  creating  a  proper   tool-­chain   that  will  enhance   traceability  of   the  safety   requirements  and  of  all   the  safety-­related  
design  choices.  A  software-­based  approach  will  provide  several  benefits  to  the  methodology,  facilitating,  in  particular,  the  
replicability,  shortening  the  time  and  costs.  
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